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Abstract 
Gasoline prices in many markets follow a saw-toothed pattern known as an Edgeworth 
Cycle.  Lewis (2009) introduces a novel way of measuring the shape of the cycle, the 
median change in price, and regresses this against a number of explanatory variables in 
US markets.  Here, we undertake a similar regression analysis, but using data from Perth, 
Australia, and with a novel measure of market structure as a regressor.  We also explore a 
novel measure, based on spectral analysis, of the use of cycles in a mixed strategy, and 
the factors which drive this use.   
 
* corresponding author 
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The Shape and Frequency of Edgeworth Price Cycles in 
an Australian Retail Gasoline Market 
Introduction 
Variability of prices is a direct concern to consumers, with clear evidence that consumers 
are antagonised by price variation even when there is no increase in average price (see 
Courty & Pagliero, 2008). Further, there is widesprad suspicion that price variability 
indicates market power, for price variation without cost variation would be inconsistent 
with marginal-cost pricing. There have been numerous st dies that have identified a saw-
tooth pattern of pricing, the Edgeworth Cycle, in many retail gasoline markets in Canada, 
the US and Australia (see, for example Verlinda, 2008, Atkinson, 2009, Noel, 2009 or 
Wang, 2009). These studies have largely focussed on the explaining the existence of the 
Edgeworth cycle and the implications for the averag price. 
 
Here we focus on other aspects of the Edgeworth cycle in retail gasoline prices. In 
particular, we follow Lewis (2009) and use the median price change as a measure of the 
extent to which prices are saw-toothed and investigate variables that might drive this 
shape.  We incorporate a unique way of measuring market structure that emphasises 
network connections between spatially distributed retail stations.  Our measure of market 
structure addresses the complex issues of competition across spatial locations that have 
featured in discussions of the competition impact of mergers among retail gasoline 
stations (see, for example, Eckert and West, 2006). We also explore a second aspect of 
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cyclicality; the use of different cycles in the mixed strategies of gasoline stations, which 
we measure using spectral analysis.  
  
Section Two of this paper explores the Edgeworth Cycle literature, whilst Section Three 
explores the dataset, with a particular focus on the development of the market structure 
measures and price spectra.  Section Four introduces the results of our model based upon 
Lewis’s (2009) measure of median price change.  Section Five introduces the results of 
the mixed strategy model.  Section Six concludes. 
Edgeworth Cycles 
Edgeworth Cycles were first posited as an equilibrium n a dynamic game by Edgeworth 
(1925) and formalised by Maskin & Tirole (1988), who gave them their name.  Their 
distinct pattern is shown in Figure One. 
 
Figure One about here 
 
Maskin & Tirole (1988) show that Edgeworth Cycles are one equilibrium of an alternate 
move game between symmetric duopolists producing an homogenous good with 
sufficiently high discount rates and who use Markov-perfect strategies in choosing their 
price from a finite grid.  The cycles arise because, for prices above the minimum, a small 
reduction in price is sufficient to capture the whole market from a rival until it moves 
again.  At the minimum, it is in the interests of bth parties for prices to move up again, 
and each plays a war of attrition as it waits for the other to raise first.  Since the first 
mover will be out of the market for two periods (the period where it raises and the period 
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when its rival raises to a price slightly below its own), the incentive is to raise the price as 
high as possible, to capture maximum benefits across the cycle.   
 
The model has been extended by Eckert (2003), who allows firms to be of different sizes, 
by Lau (2001), who shows that the necessary strategic commitment can arise in 
simultaneous move games as well, and by Noel (2008), who relaxes a host of 
assumptions, such as identical marginal costs, elasticities of demand and product 
characteristics, as well as extending the model to the three-firm case. 
 
Most of the empirical evidence for Edgeworth Cycles ha  come from studies of retail 
petroleum markets, and much of it has come from Canad .  Eckert (2003) was the first to 
study Edgeworth Cycles in Canada, focussing on examining the empirical evidence 
associated with his differential firm size model, by exploring the extent to which small 
firms are associated with cities where cycles persist.  Eckert further extends the literature 
in collaborative work with West (Eckert & West, 2004a, b, 2005) and Atkinson 
(Atkinson, Eckert & West, 2009), with a particular focus on market differences between 
Vancouver and Ottawa and, in the latter case, the chara teristics of the market in Guelph, 
Ontario, which is also studied by Atkinson (2009). 
 
Noel (2007a, b) also examines Edgeworth Cycles in Ca ada, through the lens of a 
Markov-switching model.  He explores differences between cities, periods of time (days 
of the week and months), station characteristics (particularly whether an outlet is 
controlled by a refiner-marketer or an independent chain), the market penetration of 
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independents and cycle position.  The modelling framework he uses allows him to not 
only explore what drives prices during an upswing or a downswing, but what causes 
retailers to switch from one part of the cycle to an ther. 
 
Wang (2009) studies Edgeworth Cycles in Perth, using data for a time-frame roughly 
consistent with our own.  However, his focus is different; examining the patterns of 
relenting to ascertain how the different brands use mixed strategies to determine when 
they will raise price in the outlets across the city. 
 
Lewis (2009) takes a different approach, measuring the degree to which cycles are saw-
toothed with his median change in price measure and then investigating drivers for saw-
toothedness via OLS regression.  Doyle, Muehlegger & Samphantharak (2008) also use 
this approach.  The median price change measure works because, absent of a trend in 
prices, a mismatch in the number and size of price in reases and decreases will, if the 
latter dominates, result in a small median change i price.  The greater the mismatch, the 
smaller is the median change in price, and the more saw-toothed the cycle.  Lewis (2009) 
explores the relationship between his median change in price measure and a set of 
explanatory variables including the market share of independent firms, station density, 
population, income, number of cars per household and l d area. 
Dataset  
To explore the factors which influence the pattern of pricing at each retail petroleum 
outlet, we make use of data from Perth, Western Australia.  Gasoline stations in Western 
Australia are governed by a unique regulatory regim known as FuelWatch.  Each must 
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report its next-day price to the regulator by 2pm.  The regulator then publicises that price 
which comes into effect at 6am the next day, and must remain in effect for 24 hours.  
Quite apart from the effect this regulatory regime has on the strategic games that firms 
play (see Wang, 2009), or the influence it may or may not have on the price level (see 
Davidson, 2009, for an account of this controversy), it provides for the researcher with a 
census of all prices in Perth.  This makes Perth an excellent case study. 
 
Considerable data on the Perth market, and on retail petroleum in Australia in general, 
can be found in the various recent reports by the ACCC (2007, 2008, 2009).  Here, we 
focus on the data which are used in the analyses in Sections Four and Five.   
 
The data cover the period from January 1st 2003 to March 14th 2004.  The start-date is 
chosen as data on wholesale or terminal gate prices (th  proxy for the marginal cost of 
retailers) are unavailable before this date, and the end-date is chosen because the 
following day marked the conversion of some 40 Shell outlets into Coles Express outlets 
through a joint venture between Coles and Shell.  The data do not cover all outlets in 
Perth, omitting some on the outskirts of the city, those for which the data series are 
incomplete (usually because they are new, or were closed for long periods during the 
sample period owing to a change in ownership) and those for which the retailing of fuel is 
not a core business (such as taxi depots and marinas).  Data on demand come from the 
ABS Census (ABS, 2006) whilst the remaining data come from FuelWatch, or are based 
on data in the FuelWatch database.1 
 
 7 
Table One provides information on branding, ownership tructures, co-location with 
convenience stores and distance to competitors. 
 
Table One about here 
 
Caltex has the largest market share, followed by BP and Shell.  Mobil, the fourth of the 
Majors (vertically integrated, multi-national firms active in refining, wholesale and retail 
in Australia), has a much smaller market share.  Independent chains (Gull, Liberty and 
Peak) make up roughly a quarter of the sample, making them collectively more important 
than either Shell or Mobil and slightly smaller than BP.  Supermarkets are more prevalent 
today than in the dataset, which precedes the entryof Coles, and is from a time when 
only small numbers of Woolworths outlets existed.2  Today, the two comprise almost half 
of overall fuel sales in Australia (ACCC, 2007). 
 
Company controlled outlets comprise roughly half of those in Table One.  However, 
FuelWatch defines outlets owned directly by the Majors and outlets owned by their 
multi-site franchisees as being company controlled.  In WA as a whole, Shell owns eight 
sites, BP owns five and Mobil none.  Thus, most of the outlets listed as company 
controlled in Table 2 are owned by one of the multi-site franchisees of these brands.  
Caltex has no multi-site franchises due to the terms of its 1995 merger with Ampol (see 
Walker & Woodward, 1996, for details).  Instead, it uses single site franchises and a 
price-support scheme described in detail in Wang (2009). 
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Convenience stores attached to retail petroleum outlets are often an important source of 
profits for the brands which own them.  Caltex has two convenience store brands, whilst 
Shell, Mobil and BP have one apiece.  Most Mobil out ets have a convenience store 
attached, as do around two-thirds of Caltex outlets.  The shares for BP and Shell are each 
less than one-third.  None of the independent brands has a convenience store brand, 
though some (Gull in particular) sell convenience store items in many of their outlets. 
 
Although Perth is a relatively low-density city, retail petroleum outlets tend to be located 
along highways or at the major shopping centres which exist in some suburbs.  This is in 
part due to zoning laws and in part due to a desire to be located at nodes of demand.  For 
this reason, distance to the nearest rival tends to be l w (on average just over one km) and 
the average number of competitors within five kilometres is nine.3  
 
Table Two summarises the demand data for the ABS statistical areas in Perth, showing 
city-wide averages and the upper and lower bounds of 95 percent confidence intervals 
around these averages. 
 
Table Two about here 
Market Structure 
An important aspect of this paper is the way in which we measure market structure.  
Rather than use an indirect measure, such as sellerd nsity or, as in the Edgeworth cycle 
literature reviewed in Section 2 above, the penetration of independents, we develop a 
simple theoretical model of bilateral competitive interaction and use this to determine 
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who competes with whom.  We collect these bilateral links to form a network, which 
summarises the structure of competition in the marketplaces as a whole and use simple 
graph-cutting tools to delineate local sub-markets.  We then use a number of measures of 
network structure from the mathematical sociology literature to summarise the position of 
each retail gasoline outlet in the overall structure of the global market and local sub-
markets.  These measures are used as regressors in the models outlined in Sections 4 and 
5.  We describe the process of network formation and division briefly below, and in more 
detail in Bloch & Wills-Johnson (2010a). 
 
The simple theoretical model is based upon that of Hoover (1937) and MacBride (1983), 
who study how spatial differentiation can give rise to local market power.  Our point of 
departure is to assume that consumers come to the retaile  rather than having goods 
delivered to them, and this requires the retailer to set a single price for all consumers 
without knowing from whence each has come. 
 
We examine a duopoly where each firm sells one unit of an homogenous good to a set of 
consumers whose travel plans take them past one retail gasoline outlet but who must 
deviate to frequent another (meaning purchase from the former is costless but that from 
the latter is not). Each firm has two choices; set a higher price than its rival and collect 
rents from those customers for whom deviation to its rival is costly, or set a price lower 
than its rival and endeavour to steal market share.  The advantages of each choice change 
depending upon overall price levels, and it is relatively simple to show the situations 
whereby this will give rise to an Edgeworth Cycle.  It is also relatively simple to show 
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that the minima of such price cycles will be related in a consistent fashion where firms 
compete.  Moreover, if marginal costs and the proportion passing each outlet first are 
equal, one can easily show that the minimum of each pri e cycle for each outlet in the 
duopoly will be the same (see Bloch & Wills-Johnson, 2010b). 
 
This gives rise to a simple criterion of connection.  We first form the series of price cycle 
minima for each gasoline station by taking the lowest price in the three days prior to each 
price increase of greater than five percent.4  We then undertake a simple statistical test of 
the difference between the means for each pair of outlets within five kilometres of one 
another.5  Where there is no statistically significant difference between the means, we 
deem the two outlets to be connected.  By collecting these connected pairs, we are able to 
construct a network that summarises the patterns of connection in the overall market. 
 
We then divide this network in to a series of submarkets, using an approach pioneered by 
Gould (1967), and subsequently widely used in geography (see, for example, Brookfield, 
1973): Cliff, Haggett & Ord, 1979, Boots: 1985, O’hUallachain, 1985: Thill, 1998: 
Tinkler, 1972 and 1975;,  Hay, 1975; and Straffin, 1980).   
 
The network is first converted into an adjacency matrix; a symmetric, zero-one matrix 
where a zero in the ijth position indicates that nodes i and j are not connected, and a one 
indicates that they are.  We then take the eigenvectors of this adjacency matrix.  The first 
(that is, the eigenvector associated with the largest eigenvalue) has all positive entries.  In 
order to be orthogonal to the first, the remaining eigenvectors must contain positive and 
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negative elements.  Gould (1967) suggests that clusters of positive and negative 
eigenvector elements indicate sub-groups in the overall network.  The approach is 
somewhat judgemental, but subsequent testing of the submarkets suggests they are 
reasonably robust (see Bloch & Wills-Johnson, 2010a), and indeed gives groups where 
prices are more similar than in intra-brand groupings.  
 
The results of following Gould’s (1967) approach, using the second to sixth eigenvectors 
(after which the signal to noise ratio makes it impossible to uncover further structure), 
divides the market into eight distinct sub-markets.  Figure Two, overleaf, shows the 
overall market with the eight sub-markets superimposed.  The dark-grey area represents 
the Swan River, which divides the city North from South, and the light-grey line 
represents the main north-south freeway, which divides East from West.  Placement of 
each station is approximate, but roughly correlates to the physical shape of the Perth 
market.6  The different shaded dots represent different brands.   
 
Figure Two about here 
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There are a wide variety of measures that are used to summarise network structure in the 
mathematical sociology literature.7  We use one measure of centrality and three measurs 
that reflect Burt’s (1992) notion of a structural hole in a network.  Centrality is measured 
using the approach of Bonacich (1972, 1987), who bases his measure on elements of the 
leading eigenvector of the adjacency matrix.8 
 
The importance of structural holes, or the parts of the network where there are few 
connections between densely intra-connected sub-groups, was first suggested by Burt 
(1992) who developed a series of measures associated with them.  His notion is that those 
nodes at either end of links between sub-groups will be able to leverage considerable 
informational advantage due to their location.   
 
To capture structural holes, Burt (1992) uses a number of measures.  What Burt (1992) 
terms the redundant portion of one node’s relationship with another node is the extent to 
which their relationship is through other nodes connected to both of them. The more 
indirect connections the two nodes have, the more redundant are these connections, as 
there are many paths down which information can flow.  The effective size of the 
network for a given node is the sum of the non-redundant portions of its relationships 
with all other nodes in the network, and ranges from one to N, the total number of nodes 
in the network.  The efficiency of the network for a given node is its effective size 
divided by N.  A more efficient network is one where structural ho es are better situated 
from the perspective of the node for which efficieny is being calculated. 
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 Constraint is the absence of structural holes, meaning that, even if a node severs its direct 
connection with another node, indirect connections mean that it is still restricted by that 
node.  Burt (1992) defines constraint as the sum of the proportion of network time spent 
on connections with a given node and across all other nodes which that node and the node 
for which constraint is being calculated are connected to.   
 
We make use of Burt’s (1992) measures of efficiency and constraint, and also limited use 
of his measure of redundancy. We calculate the centrality, efficiency and constrain scores 
for each outlet, both globally and in each local sub-market, using the Ucinet software 
developed by Borgatti, Everett & Freeman (2002).  The distribution of scores for each of 
the network characteristics is presented in Table Thr e.  Note that we have normalised 
the centrality scores such that they range from zero to one, like the constraint and 
efficiency scores.   
   
Table Three about here 
Prices 
In Sections Four and Five, we explore two models; with median change in price and 
spectral power as the dependent variables, respectively.  Here we explore the data 
underlying these two dependent variables in more detail, beginning with spectral power. 
 
Spectral power summarises the amount of variation in prices which can be attributed to 
cycles of a particular length.  The higher the spectral power for a particular cycle, the 
more that cycle is used in the pricing strategies of the relevant gasoline station.   
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To calculate spectral power, we follow the approach outlined in Granger & Hatanaka 
(1964) and construct a spectrogram for prices and margins,9 dividing the spectra into 42 
different frequency bands.10  Spectral analysis becomes complicated with non-stationary 
data, so prior to constructing the spectrograms, we conduct a Phillips-Perron unit root test 
on the data in their natural order (from t0 to t441), and in their reversed order (t441 to t0) to 
demonstrate robustness.  There is little evidence of non-stationarity. 
 
Figure Three shows the resulting spectrogram for magins.  The results for price are 
similar, but those for margins are clearer as margin l costs (which contribute to variation) 
have been removed.  In Figure Three, the solid light grey lines indicate shell outlet, the 
medium grey line indicate BP, the dark grey lines Caltex, the black lines Mobil and the 
dotted light-grey lines the independent and supermarket brands.  The thick black line 
shows the average power for each frequency band. 
 
Figure Three about here 
The most obvious aspect of Figure Three is the dualpe k at seven and ten days.11  This is 
most pronounced for BP and Shell. It is not the case that some outlets follow cycles of 
seven days and some follow cycles of ten days; most in fact exhibit peaks at both 
frequency bands.  It is this dual peak that is suggestive of the use of mixed strategies. 
 
The dual peak should not be surprising.  Indeed, it is more logical than a single peak.  If a 
retail petroleum outlet consistently followed a seven day cycle, this would become 
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immediately obvious to all of its rivals, each of whom could then underbid it on the 
eighth day and capture market share.   
 
Calculation of Lewis’s (2009) median change in price measure is much simpler, and the 
results are presented in Figure Four as a histogram.  Note that most stations have a value 
close to minus one; indicative of the saw-toothed Edgeworth cycle pattern. 
 
Figure Four about here 
Median Price Change Model 
We now turn to the first of our models; that exploring factors influencing the median 










    (1) 
 
The variables in Equation One are defined in Table Four below.   
 
Table Four about here 
 
We test a number of different forms of the model defined in Equation One, omitting 
different independent variables.  The results for the model which, based upon likelihood 
ratio tests, best fits the data are presented in Table Five. 
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Table Five about here 
 
The F-test and R-squared results suggest, respectively, that the model is valid and fits the 
data reasonably well.  The Breusch-Pagan test statistic suggests homoscedasticity. 
 
There appears to be little influence on median change i  price from any of the network 
structure variables; only global eigenvector centrality, is significant and only then at the 
ten percent level.  It suggests that more central outlets are the ones with higher median 
price changes and hence cycles which are less saw-toothed in nature, but the coefficient 
is very small.   
 
The independent brands and Woolworths, along with the branded independents and larger 
independent types tend to have higher median price changes, and hence cycles with a less 
saw-toothed nature, than the omitted dummies.  Thismay be reflective of these outlets 
increasing their prices more cautiously; often taking two days when the Majors take one.   
 
Very few of the variables in Table Five above are stati tically significant.  It is thus 
helpful to consider what happens if variables are added.12  Adding the demand 
characteristic variables makes little difference to overall results, and indeed, most of the 
demand characteristics have insignificant coefficients.  Subsequently adding the EGOR 
variables changes little outside the network characte istic variables, but it does make 
some important changes to the network characteristic variables.  Global centrality loses 
its significance, but global constraint becomes negative and significant at the five percent 
 17 
level, whilst local efficiency and local constraint become positive and significant at the 
ten percent level.   
 
The negative global constraint coefficient suggests that more constrained outlets are 
likely to have cycles with sharper upswings, which may be suggestive of outlets sitting at 
the junction points between sub-markets (the least constrained in the dataset) acting to 
attenuate price signals travelling between sub-markets. 
 
The positive local constraint and local efficiency coefficients at first appear counter-
intuitive.  A positive local efficiency coefficient suggests similar conclusions to the 
negative global constraint conclusion; that those in a good position (here a position for 
which the local market is efficient for the given retailer) can exploit the informational 
advantage that results and leverage some market power.  However, the positive local 
constraint coefficient does not fit this story.  Further examination shows that the outlets 
with the higher local constraint scores tend to be n the periphery of each local market 
(and indeed on the periphery of the Perth market as a whole), and we suggest that what is 
actually occurring is that these outlets, with access to customers unavailable to those not 
on the periphery, exploit their higher degree of market power by charging these 
customers higher prices rather than fighting for the customers they must share with non-
peripheral outlets. 
Spectral Power Models 
The spectral power models are intended to capture the xtent to which outlets use more or 
less of a cycle of a given length in their pricing strategies, and the factors that might drive 
 18 
such a decision.  The models have the form below, where again the variables are as 
defined in Table Four, except SPM7 and SPM10, which refer to the spectral power of the 






















    (XX) 
 
As with the median change in price model above, we examine more restrictive forms of 
the models by dropping independent variables and coucting likelihood ratio tests to 
ascertain whether this provides more robust results.  The seven-day cycle regression 
results favour a slightly more restrictive model (omitting the DCHAR variables) than the 
ten-day cycle regression, but we use the more general model in both cases to allow a 
comparison of like with like.  The results of these analyses are shown in Table Six. 
 
Table Six about here 
 
Both models provide a reasonably good fit to the data.  Whilst heteroscedasticity may be 
an issue, the characteristics of the dependent variable force the use of robust standard 
errors in any case.13 Hence, Breusch-Pagan test statistic results are not presented here.  
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We examine a number of different model types by omitting different dummies and 
explanatory variables, but find that the results are consistent with those shown in Table 
Six, with the exception noted below.  Thus the models o not appear to be mis-specified.  
 
The results above are reasonably consistent with those in the median price change 
regressions.  The globally more constrained outlets are more likely to exhibit price cycles 
of both durations, but are most likely to be using more seven-day cycles in their mix of 
strategies.  Thus, those outlets with cycles with sharper upswings are also likely to exhibit 
shorter cycles.  Similar conclusions as drawn above f r median changes in price might 
also be drawn for local efficiency and constraint in Table Six.  Local efficiency and 
constraint results are negative, with both having a higher absolute value for seven-day 
cycles.  This suggests that those with some market power (due either to superior location 
in the market or to peripheral location with access to consumers others cannot access) use 
cycles less in their mixed strategies, and seven-day cycles least.   
 
Global centrality is significant at the ten percent l vel, and is negative, suggesting that 
more central outlets are less likely to have either kind of cycle and least likely to have 
ten-day cycles.  This is consistent with the median price change results, where such 
outlets exhibited cycles which are less saw-toothed, an  is similarly weak as alterations to 
the model specification mean this variable loses its ignificance. 
 
Differences in results for submarkets are not particularly clear, but those for branding are; 
all brands have less cycle power than the omitted dummy, Shell.  Recall from Figure 
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Three that the Shell outlets had the highest spectral power across these two bands.  This 
same result is reflected in the branding coefficients. 
 
Branded independents and larger independents are both likely to make less use of cycles 
than the omitted case (company controlled outlets).  This is consistent with the results for 
median price in that these outlets cycle less and have cycles with a less saw-toothed 
nature.   In general, however, these outlets have higher prices, suggesting that their pro-
competitive effect is limited in the Perth market once location in the market structure is 
taken into account. 
 
There are very few demand characteristics that are significant.  The only one which is 
significant across both regressions is the number of competitors within five kilometres 
(DCHAR15), and it is positive.  This suggests that seller density leads to more cycles.  
Thus, if more players lead to more competition, onecould infer that cycles are pro-
competitive.  The fact that the coefficient is the same for both types of cycle suggests that 
this demand-side factor does not favour one kind of cycle over another. 
Conclusions 
In this paper, we have explored factors which drive both the Edgeworth shape of retail 
petroleum prices in the Perth market and the degree to which each outlet utilises cycles of 
a particular length in its mixed strategies.  The former we measure using Lewis’s (2009) 
measure, the median change in price, and the latterwe measure via the spectral power of 
the two most common cycles seen in the data.  The latt r measure is novel to this paper, 
although Wang (2009) has also explored the use of mixed strategies in the Perth retail 
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petroleum market in a different context by examining which brand leads prices upwards 
in each cycle. 
 
We also introduce a novel measure of market structue.  Whereas previous papers in the 
literature have proxied market structure by use of variables, such as density of sellers or 
numbers of independents, we measure it here more directly by developing a network 
outlining which outlets compete with which. Then weuse methods from the 
mathematical sociology literature and from geography to develop summary statistics for 
these networks that can then form inputs into the regression. 
 
We find that market structure does influence both the shape of cycles and their length, 
and the results suggest that a position wherein outlets can exercise a degree of market 
power both decrease the saw-toothed nature of cycles and decrease their use of both types 
of cycles.  Demand factors, interestingly, appear to play little role in the shape or the 
length of cycles.  Greater independence from the Majors, either through independent 
ownership or through being an independent brand, tes to decrease the saw-toothed 
nature of cycles and the use of cycles, but all brands make less use of cycles than Shell 
does.  This suggests that independents might not have t e pro-competitive effect found 
elsewhere in the Edgeworth Cycle literature, once market location is taken into account. 
 
The results of this study are useful not only for the light they shed on market behaviour, 
but also for the novel techniques introduced.  The us  of spectral analysis allows for a 
more subtle appreciation of the use of cycles than has existed previously, particularly in 
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Australia.  The more direct network measures allow a different interpretation of market 
structure, which might find use not only in academic studies, but also in competition 
policy. In particular, our results using the new measures suggest that competition is a 
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Table 1. Perth market players summary 
Branding Competitors Within 5km 
Distance to Nearest 
Competitor 











BP 52 16 Branded Independent 23 up to 2 10 up to 0.4 38 
Caltex  57 29 Company Controlled 99 3 or 4 16 0.41 to 0.8 38 
Woolworths 4   Distributor Controlled 2 5 or 6 31 0.81 to 1.2 41 
Gull 27   Independent 2 7 or 8 35 1.21 to 1.6 35 
Independent 2   Larger Independent 37 9 or 10 43 1.61 to 2 39 
Liberty 5   Price Supported 42 11 or 12 37 2.01 to 2.4 8 
Mobil 13 11 Supermarket 4 13 or 14 13 2.41 to 2.8 5 
Peak 13   15 or 16 17 2.81 to 3.2 2 
Shell 35 8 > 16 7 > 3.2 3 
Wesco 1   
  




Table 2. Demand-side characteristics 
  Lower Bound Average Upper Bound 
Median family Income 1321.5133 1362.7889 1404.0645 
Average household size 2.4503018 2.4922705 2.5342392 
Number aboriginal 312.46014 362.88406 413.30798 
Number persons 19931.575 21479.348 23027.121 
Number born overseas 7627.2796 8243.0386 8858.7977 
Number of families with dependent children 2360.4874 2569.7826 2779.0778 
Number of families with Single Mother 817.59251 896.27536 974.95822 
Number of families 5295.9837 5731.7971 6167.6105 
Av Number vehicles per household 1.4479305 1.468148 1.4883671 
Dwelling density (houses per sq km) 431.34798 468.12804 504.90811 
Number of rented dwellings 1830.5952 1969.9517 2109.3081 
Number of state housing dwellings 265.2835 308.80676 352.33003 
Number of dwellings 7355.8529 7889.7585 8423.664 
number with post-school qualification 6566.6349 7041.1932 7515.7516 
Number employed 9735.9579 10502.449 11268.941 
Number using public transport for work travel 861.123 4 915.24638 969.36962 
Source: ABS (2006) 
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0.1 0 206 168 0 204 64 
0.2 7 0 12 15 0 18 
0.3 15 0 2 22 0 16 
0.4 52 0 6 54 0 18 
0.5 55 0 1 58 0 20 
0.6 44 0 3 36 0 18 
0.7 23 0 7 13 0 24 
0.8 7 0 5 3 0 21 
0.9 0 0 1 0 0 4 
1 5 2 3 7 4 5 
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Table Four: Abbreviations for Variables 
Group Variable Code Group Variable Code 
Retail Price RPRICE Median family Income DCHAR1 





Median Price Change MPC Number aboriginal DCHAR3 
Ampol BR1 Number persons DCHAR4 
BP BR2 Number born overseas DCHAR5 
Caltex BR3 Number of families with dependent children DCHAR6 
Caltex-Woolworths BR4 Number of families with Single Mother DCHAR7 
Gull BR5 Number of families DCHAR8 
Independent BR6 Av Number vehicles per hh DCHAR9 
Liberty BR7 Dwelling density (houses per sq km) DCHAR10 
Mobil BR8 Number of rented dwellings DCHAR11 
Peak BR9 Number of state housing dwellings DCHAR12 





Wesco BR11 Number with post-school qualification DCHAR14 
Branded Independent TP1 Number employed DCHAR15 
Company Controlled TP2 Number using public transport for work travel DCHAR16 
Distributor Controlled TP3 On a main Rd DCHAR17 
Independent TP4 Number of competitors within 5km DCHAR18 
















Distance to nearest competitor DCHAR19 




Supermarket TP7 Global Constraint NCHAR2 
BP Connect CS1 Global Centrality NCHAR4 
Caltex Starmart CS2 Local Efficiency NCHAR5 
Caltex Starshop CS3 Local Constraint NCHAR6 


























Shell Select CS5 Redundancy of most central EGOR1 
Fremantle SUBM1 Redundancy of 2nd most central EGOR2 
Curtin SUBM2 Redundancy of 3rd most central EGOR3 
Midland SUBM3 Redundancy of 4th most central EGOR4 
























Redundancy of 5th most central EGOR5 
Fwy North SUBM5 
City Central SUBM6 









Melville SUBM8  
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Table Five: Median Price Change Model Results 
Variable Coefficient T-Statistic Variable Coefficient T-Statistic 
Constant -1.04732 -8.25631 BR1 0.05899 0.70147 
NCHAR1 -0.11031 -0.58854 BR2 0.03700 0.72697 
NCHAR2 -0.33715 -1.51988 BR3 0.05093 0.67496 
NCHAR4 0.00426 1.86880 BR4 0.27993 2.74504 
NCHAR5 0.26703 1.59974 BR5 -0.03128 -0.24265 
NCHAR6 0.33809 1.53300 BR6 0.82450 5.79575 
NCHAR8 -0.00083 -0.54209 BR7 -0.01143 -0.10191 
SUBM1 0.05362 1.04624 BR8 0.00815 0.05836 
SUBM2 -0.09129 -1.41096 BR9 0.27001 2.14117 
SUBM3 -0.01592 -0.19248 BR11 0.70771 3.05880 
SUBM4 -0.06958 -1.27080 CS1 -0.00554 -0.08641 
SUBM5 -0.10595 -2.02266 CS2 -0.04707 -0.67879 
SUBM6 -0.11317 -1.83955 CS3 -0.00305 -0.04675 
SUBM7 -0.12746 -1.18920 CS4 0.02073 0.14003 
TP1 0.81040 11.73039 
TP3 -0.04194 -0.29146 
TP4 0.00000 0.00000 
TP5 0.29887 2.31416 
TP6 -0.02020 -0.32377 
  TP7 0.00000 0.00000 
Centred R^2 0.7490 
R-Bar^2 0.7047 
Regression F Statistic 16.9386 
Log Likelihood 69.7611 
Breusch Pagan Test Statistic 55.0298 
 
 38 
Table Six: Seven and Ten Day Spectral Power – Regression Model Five Results 
Seven - Day Price Cycles Ten - Day Price Cycles 
Variable Coeff. t-stat Variable Coeff. t-stat Variable Coeff. t-stat Variable Coeff. t-stat 
Constant 15.6935 3.2248 TP1 -7.4207 -4.7725 Constant 10.1932 2.9666 TP1 -7.90027 -7.46104 
NCHAR1 1.3964 0.5901 TP3 -1.1206 -0.7492 NCHAR1 1.22 3 0.8730 TP3 -0.39152 -0.42224 
NCHAR2 8.2825 2.2181 TP4 0.0000 0.0000 NCHAR2 6.6673 2.5691 TP4 0.00000 0.00000 
NCHAR4 -0.0820 -1.8182 TP5 -4.6258 -2.3006 NCHAR4 -0.0538 -1.8031 TP5 -4.70191 -3.35201 
NCHAR5 -5.0727 -2.1955 TP6 0.3555 0.4451 NCHAR5 -4.0269 -2.7092 TP6 -0.13542 -0.31789 
NCHAR6 -8.6476 -2.7830 TP7 0.0000 0.0000 NCHAR6 -5.4102 -2.5799 TP7 0.00000 0.00000 
NCHAR8 -0.0124 -0.4499 DCHAR1 0.0031 1.1274 NCHAR8 -0.0081 -0.4388 DCHAR1 0.00378 2.21696 
SUBM1 -0.4146 -0.3849 DCHAR2 4.2475 1.3189 SUBM1 -0.0045 -0.0065 DCHAR2 0.10420 0.04551 
SUBM2 1.3942 1.0280 DCHAR3 0.0045 1.0977 SUBM2 2.0552 2.2799 DCHAR3 0.00174 0.70982 
SUBM3 -4.4610 -2.1161 DCHAR4 -0.0009 -0.9218 SUBM3 -2.8790 -2.0824 DCHAR4 -0.00056 -0.75507 
SUBM4 0.0343 0.0312 DCHAR5 0.0002 0.4606 SUBM4 0.7634 1.2679 DCHAR5 0.00003 0.07540 
SUBM5 0.7627 0.7170 DCHAR6 0.0029 1.3251 SUBM5 1.2644 1.7900 DCHAR6 0.00252 1.56020 
SUBM6 -0.1087 -0.0832 DCHAR7 0.0004 0.2129 SUBM6 0.4372 0.5178 DCHAR7 -0.00071 -0.49998 
SUBM7 4.5183 1.6181 DCHAR8 -0.0023 -0.9720 SUBM7 2.2679 1.5028 DCHAR8 -0.00057 -0.35805 
BR1 -1.8069 -1.7737 DCHAR9 -6.4642 -0.9333 BR1 -9.0679 -10.2682 DCHAR9 1.34370 0.26985 
BR2 -5.1517 -7.0662 DCHAR10 0.0011 0.8162 BR2 -5.1842 -10.2087 DCHAR10 -0.00140 -1.51763 
BR3 -2.4791 -2.5083 DCHAR11 0.0019 1.1635 BR3 -9.1768 -15.7920 DCHAR11 0.00070 0.65442 
BR4 -8.4755 -5.1112 DCHAR12 -0.0026 -1.5559 BR4 -8.1238 -6.2792 DCHAR12 0.00018 0.16694 
BR5 -5.1594 -2.3128 DCHAR13 0.0004 0.2048 BR5 -7.2429 -4.7907 DCHAR13 0.00071 0.49815 
BR6 -12.8443 -12.1843 DCHAR14 -0.0002 -0.2949 BR6 -13.7604 -11.8007 DCHAR14 -0.00084 -2.00682 
BR7 -5.4631 -1.8442 DCHAR15 0.0020 2.3063 BR7 -6.9554 -4.7183 DCHAR15 0.00069 1.06348 
BR8 -7.3549 -4.4694 DCHAR16 -0.0053 -1.9396 BR8 -7.4531 -12.6108 DCHAR16 0.00005 0.02877 
BR9 -8.3313 -4.1622 DCHAR17 0.7583 0.8401 BR9 -8.4403 -5.9852 DCHAR17 0.71491 1.30862 
BR11 -13.3722 -6.4875 DCHAR18 0.3620 2.5098 BR11 -12.9712 -8.8309 DCHAR18 0.36107 3.44100 
CS1 -0.1282 -0.1784 DCHAR19 0.0205 0.0800 CS1 -0.1893 -0.3865 DCHAR19 0.08961 0.50854 
CS2 1.5066 2.0913       CS2 0.3687 0.8726       
CS3 0.6025 0.7780       CS3 0.4473 1.0915       
CS4 -0.7673 -0.4642       CS4 -0.5706 -0.8174       
Centred R^2 0.818533 Centred R^2 0.894139 
R-Bar^2 0.760741 R-Bar^2 0.860426 







                                                
1 The authors would like to thank the FuelWatch regulator for making this dataset available. 
2 Coles and Woolworths are the two major grocery retail rs in Australia.   
3 Distances between each pair of outlets were calculated manually using en electronic version of the Perth 
street directory.  All distances were calculated based on the shortest distance by road. 
4 Looking four days prior and using different price ncreases made little difference to results; the increasing 
phase of each price cycle is quite clear in the data. 
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5 The ACCC adopted this local market definition in a recent merger decision (see 
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/904296), and a similar distance has been used to define 
local markets in the US literature (see Hastings, 2004 or USSPSICGA, 2002).  We use it as a provisional 
measure of local markets, to avoid having to test every possible bilateral pair in a collection of 208 gasoline 
stations. 
6 The software used to construct the networks and calculate their structural characteristics (Borgatti, 
Everett, & Freeman, 2002) has only limited capabilities in terms of spatial mapping. 
7 See Borgatti & Everett (2005) for a mathematical trea ment of different centrality measures, Granovetter 
(2005) or Burt (2000) for a summary of the debate in the literature about the importance of density 
(summarised by centrality for a given node) versus structural holes, and Burt (2000, 2002, 2005) for a 
summary of the literature on structural holes. 
8 Gould (1967) uses an identical measure, but not the erm centrality.  Bonacich (1972) appears to develop 
his measure independent of Gould, and there appears to be only limited crossover between the literature in 
the fields of geography and sociology. 
9 In most cases, particularly in the physical sciences where spectral analysis is widely used, this approach 
has been superseded by the use of fast Fourier transfo mation or, more recently, by maximum entropy 
approaches (see Press, Teukolsky, Vetterling and Flannery, 2007 for a textbook treatment).  These 
approaches give more precise results, but require specialist software, whilst the approach of Granger and
Hatanaka (1964) can be relatively easily implemented using a spreadsheet.  Moreover, experimentation 
with more sophisticated techniques for some retail petroleum outlets produced spectrograms very similar to 
those in Figure 3. 
10 Chatfield (2006) suggests the use of, M=2√N is common in the literature, where M is the number of 
frequency bands and N the number of observations.  Here, N=441, thus M=42. 
11 Peaks at 21, 14 and 3.5 days are echoes of the seven-day cycle, a common occurrence in spectrograms.  
The longest period encapsulates all cycles longer than 84 days, and is thus picking up longer-term cycles 
such as changes in crude prices and seasonal variation. 
12 We also explore the consequences of omitting different dummy variables, but the results (available from 
the authors upon request) are not significantly different from those presented here. 
13 The processing of the data required to obtain the spectral power results seen in Figure Three mean that it 
is unlikely that normality of the error terms remains a valid assumption. 
